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Criminal Culpability after the Act
Mark Dsouza*
INTRODUCTION
This article is concerned with criminal culpability—culpability relating to criminal
blame—which I treat as separate from moral culpability, which is concerned with
moral blame. In it, I propose a reﬁnement in the organisation of the theoretical analysis
of criminal culpability. I argue that this reﬁnement improves the criminal law’s ability to
generate fair blaming judgments and labels.
I begin by outlining in Sections 2 and 3 the manner in which existing theories fail to
provide a satisfactory account of culpability in the criminal law, especially in relation to
some cases involving culpability assessments made by comparing the actions of the
defendant to those of the notional reasonable person. In Section 4, I argue that these fail-
ings are symptomatic of a deeper problem in the organisation of the culpability analysis
—they are attributable, at least in part, to a failure to recognise that the concept of culp-
ability performs different functions at the different temporal stages of the criminal law. I
suggest that we need one conception of culpability for the criminal law’s advance
conduct guidance formulation stage, and another for the conduct evaluation stage
which begins after the commission of a prima facie criminal act. I develop a conception
of criminal culpability that better explains the culpability analysis at the second (‘after
the act’) stage of the criminal law in Section 5. I start by explaining that criminal culp-
ability after the act should be located in failing to choose one’s actions in accordance
with the criminal law’s advance conduct guidance. Next I identify the sources of gui-
dance in the criminal law. Finally, I distinguish between blame and blameworthiness
in order to demonstrate that this account of criminal culpability does not compel us
to embrace a result-independent conception of the criminality of conduct. Section 6
is dedicated to exploring the practical implications of theorising criminal culpability sep-
arately for the criminal law’s advance ‘guidance’ and subsequent ‘evaluation’ stages, and
of adopting the proposed account of criminal culpability after the act. I demonstrate that
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the model of criminal culpability proposed herein can account for blaming judgments
made in respect of all instances of advertent wrongdoing, as well as most instances of
inadvertent wrongdoing. In doing so, it isolates intuitively troubling criminal blaming
judgments, and allows us to argue for the rejection of only those judgments. The result-
ing system of law is both recognisably related to existing systems of the criminal law, and
an improvement on them in terms of the ability to generate fair blaming judgments. Fur-
thermore, it allows us to sidestep vexed doctrinal questions relating to which character-
istics of a given defendant ought to be attributed to the reasonable person by reference to
which she is sometimes judged.
I. FAULT LINES IN CRIMINAL CULPABILITY
The conception of criminal culpability that has become dominant in England and Wales
occasionally generates blaming outcomes that are deeply troubling. Consider for
instance the following example.
D is infatuated with V, and would never do anything to hurt or offend her. Based on
his several previous interactions with V, D comes to believe that V reciprocates his feel-
ings. Unlike most people, D is keenly aware that almost every aspect of his life—his love
life included—is regulated by the law, and so he does some research. He notes that the
Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 1, says that a person (A) will be guilty of rape if he inten-
tionally has penetrative sexual intercourse with another (B), when B does not consent
to the penetration, and A does not reasonably believe that B consents. D studies this pro-
vision in order to identify the range of things he may do vis-à-vis his feelings for V, while
not committing rape. D notes that he must not have penetrative sex with V unless he
believes that V consents to the penetration. He further notes that his belief in V’s
consent must not be capricious—D must make sure that his belief is reasonable.
One evening, D initiates heavy petting with V, and V does not dissuade him. This
reinforces D’s belief that V is a willing participant. Moreover, D is convinced that his
belief is founded on reasonable grounds—V has always seemed happy to see him, and
D and V have had several interactions that appeared ﬂirtatious to D. One thing leads
to another, and D has sexual intercourse with V. In fact, V does not consent to sexual
intercourse, but also does not resist, because she is terriﬁed of D—her ‘ﬂirtation’ had
actually been behaviour designed to keep D from reacting aggressively to overt rejection,
rather than to encourage him.
At his trial for rape, it emerges that D has been suffering from previously undiag-
nosed learning difﬁculties and a personality disorder that cumulatively make it very dif-
ﬁcult for him to perceive and correctly interpret social cues and the behaviour of others.
However, in terms of the criminal law’s idiosyncratic conception of insanity, he is not
insane. An objectively reasonable (ie, not mentally ill) person would not have interpreted
V’s pattern of behaviour towards D as suggesting consent to sexual intercourse, but D
honestly (and in his own eyes, very reasonably) believed that V was consenting all
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along. Given that D had correctly identiﬁed the guidance contained in the Sexual
Offences Act 2003, s 1, and had selected his behaviour by reference to that guidance,
one might expect that D would be entitled to an acquittal. However, in the recent
case of R v B (MA),1 the Court of Appeal strongly suggested that on such facts, D
would be guilty of rape.2 It held that in principle, since a reasonable person would
not have believed that V was consenting, D should be labelled a rapist even though he
genuinely thought that his belief that V was consenting to—even welcoming—sexual
intercourse, was objectively reasonable. Understandably, the court was not willing to
attribute D’s mental illness to the reasonable person—in law, the notion of a reasonable
mentally ill person is oxymoronic.
Arguments about doctrine apart, this sort of ruling would give rise to two concerns
about culpability in the criminal law. First, if we momentarily set aside our sympathy for
the plight of V, there seems to be something deeply disturbing about the labelling
outcome generated by this approach. It would assign the label of ‘rapist’ to a person
who would never dream of forcing himself upon another—who in fact who had delib-
erated carefully before concluding that his prospective sexual partner was really consent-
ing—mainly because mental illness has affected his ability to correctly analyse a
situation. Even more worryingly, this label is shared by offenders who are unambigu-
ously contemptuous of the sexual autonomy of others. And second, if the Court of
Appeal’s ruling is correct, then it seems difﬁcult to identify the source of D’s culpability,
given that D made every effort to follow the advance guidance contained in the Sexual
Offences Act 2003, s 1.
Similar concerns potentially arise each time a defendant’s culpability at trial depends
on comparing her actions with that of the reasonable person. But how real are these con-
cerns? In the context of the example stated, one preliminary response to the concerns
identiﬁed might be to dispute D’s distillation of the advance guidance contained in
the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 1. Speciﬁcally, one might say that the guidance to D
was not that D must assure himself that his belief in V’s consent was reasonable
1 [2013] EWCA Crim 3; [2013] 1 Cr App R 36.
2 Strictly, this part of the ruling was obiter dicta. However, it does ﬂow from the doctrinal and common law
principles the court identiﬁed as governing this area of law. The court expressly stopped short of saying
that a person with the sort of difﬁculties described would deﬁnitely be convicted:
Whether (for example) [… the belief of… ] a particular defendant of less than ordinary intelli-
gence or with demonstrated inability to recognise behavioural cues might be [… not unreason-
able, even though it would not have been held by most people… ], or whether his belief ought
properly to be characterised as unreasonable, must await a decision on speciﬁc facts. [41]
Even so, it held in no uncertain terms that:
… unless and until the state of mind amounts to insanity in law,… under the rule enacted in the
Sexual Offences Act beliefs in consent arising from conditions such as delusional psychotic illness
or personality disorders must be judged by objective standards of reasonableness and not by
taking into account a mental disorder which induced a belief which could not reasonably have
arisen without it. [40]
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(ie, reﬂect on the grounds on which his belief in consent is held, and satisfy himself that
they are reasonable)—rather, it was that D’s belief must in fact be reasonable. So stated,
D does not obey the advance guidance, because his belief in V’s consent is not, in fact,
reasonable. Thus, the premise of the second concern fails, and the ﬁrst concern is simply
rejected.
This response is unsatisfactory. It is true that the requirement that D’s belief not be
unreasonable has been stated such that it appears to require the objective existence of a
state of affairs viz, the existence of a belief in D’s mind, which belief does not possess
the quality of being reasonable. This would make the ‘reasonable belief in consent’
element seem like a circumstance element of the actus reus of rape. However, it is in
fact part of the mens rea of the offence of rape, and has repeatedly been treated as
such both by courts and commentators.3 As such, one of its functions is to provide
fair warning to D as to what D should do to avoid criminal liability.4 Advance guidance
as to what state of affairs should objectively exist is no guidance—or at least no useful
conduct guidance—to the public at all. The concerns identiﬁed therefore remain real.
Moreover, as will be explained in the next section, existing accounts of criminal culp-
ability struggle to adequately address these concerns, without generating distortions
elsewhere.
II. WHERE CURRENT ACCOUNTS OF CRIMINAL CULPABILITY FALL SHORT
Culpability theorists see their task as explaining the link between a moral agent, D, and a
proper blaming judgment for causing some prohibited consequence ‘w’5—as identify-
ing, that is, the circumstances in which it is legitimate to blame D for causing w. They
3 See for instance AP Simester and others, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (Hart
Publishing, 5th edn 2013) 477–78; Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford
University Press, 6th edn 2014) 446–51; HM Keating and others, Clarkson and Keating: Criminal Law
(Sweet & Maxwell, 8th edn 2014) 661–66.
4 John Gardner, ‘Wrongs and Faults’ in AP Simester (ed), Appraising Strict Liability (Oxford University
Press 2005) 70. See also Winnie Chan and AP Simester, ‘Four Functions of Mens Rea’ (2011) 70(2) Cam-
bridge Law Journal 381, 389–94. Chan and Simester accept the general point that mens rea facilitates fair
warning, but caveat that the fair warning principle is not absolute. Thus they defend the imposition of
criminal liability for some inadvertent harming (ie, negligence-based crimes), especially in the context
of the performance of speciﬁc, chosen, activities (like sexual intercourse, for instance), in which the
actor can be treated as having implicitly been put on notice of a requirement for special alertness.
Notice however that even in their argument, the actor is put on notice of what she should do—ie, ‘take
care’, or exhibit special alertness. See also George Sher, Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness
(Oxford University Press 2009) 112, who considers and rejects the same proposition—that guidance
relates to what one should do—in the context of guidance emanating from morality and prudence. What-
ever the merits of Sher’s argument, the weight of criminal legal theory suggests that morality and pru-
dence, at least when translated into the mens rea requirements of a criminal offence, is meant to be
action-guiding.
5 See AP Simester, ‘A Disintegrated Theory of Culpability’ in Dennis J Baker and Jeremy Horder (eds), The
Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press 2013) 180.
King’s Law Journal 443
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
ive
rp
oo
l] 
at 
09
:02
 09
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
attempt to do so by reference to theories focusing on factors such as the defendant’s
choice,6 capacity7 and character.8 Since the primary focus in this paper is the organis-
ation of the culpability analysis, rather than the details of the various current theories
of culpability, I will not recount the extant culpability theories in any detail here. For
the present purposes, it sufﬁces to brieﬂy identify the areas of weakness usually identiﬁed
in each type of culpability theory, as applied to the criminal law.9
In general, choice theories of criminal culpability or blameworthiness explain that
D is criminally culpable or blameworthy for causing w only if she chooses not to
exercise her capacity to avoid causing w.10 Therefore, a choice theorist would not
ﬁnd the hypothetical defendant in R v B (MA) culpable. However, choice theorists
struggle to explain the widespread incidence of negligence-based criminal liability
for inadvertent wing. They either resort to contrived and unconvincing choice-
based explanations of criminal liability for negligence,11 or propose implausibly revi-
sionist accounts of the criminal law in which criminal liability for inadvertent wing is
excluded altogether.12
Still, the fact that choice theories do not explain all criminal law blaming decisions
that can be observed in doctrine means at least that they are capable of critiquing extant
criminal justice systems for being over-inclusive. It seems arrogant and implausible to
suppose that criminal law doctrine has developed to the point that it is never over-
inclusive.13 Capacity and character theories, which ﬁnd it easier to link inadvertent
wing to D, struggle to replicate the choice theories’ ability to critique criminal law doc-
trine for over-inclusiveness. On a standard capacity theory, D is culpable for wing if (a)
she failed to take those precautions against wing which any reasonable person with
6 Michael S Moore, ‘Choice, Character, and Excuse’ (1990) 7(2) Social Philosophy and Policy 29. See also
Michael S Moore and Heidi M Hurd, ‘Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selﬁsh:
The Culpability of Negligence’ (2011) 5 Criminal Law and Philosophy 147, 172–73.
7 See for instance HLA Hart, ‘Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility’ in HLA Hart and John
Gardner (eds), Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 2008) 154.
8 See for instance Michael D Bayles, ‘Character, Purpose and Criminal Responsibility’ (1982) 1(1) Law and
Philosophy 5.
9 Admittedly, this section does not do justice to the variety of versions of each type of culpability theory, and
different accounts of culpability are able to deal with the criticisms recounted here to differing extents.
This section should therefore be taken as merely a sketch, providing context for the discussion to follow.
10 Moore (n 6) at 57; Claire Finkelstein, ‘Responsibility for Unintended Consequences’ (2005) 2 Ohio State
Journal of Criminal Law 579. See also in this connection Simester (n 5) at 185.
11 See for instance Jean Hampton, ‘Mens Rea’ (1990) 7(2) Social Philosophy and Policy 1, 27–28 for one such
unconvincing attempt. Hampton tries to depict negligence-based liability as liability for a prior choice to
not develop a responsible character. For a critique of Hampton’s attempt, see Jeremy Horder, ‘Criminal
Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory’ (1993) 12(2) Law and Philosophy 193, 196–98.
12 See for instance the choice-based theories proposed in Moore (n 6); Moore and Hurd (n 6); Finkelstein (n
10). See also in this connection Simester (n 5) at 185, 191; AP Simester, ‘Responsibility for Inadvertent
Acts’ (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 601, 603.
13 In fact, it is often the contrary view that is expressed, at least by academics. Consider for example, A Ash-
worth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 225; DN Husak, ‘The Crim-
inal Law as Last Resort’ (2004) 24(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 207, 208; SH Kadish, ‘The Crisis of
Overcriminalization’ (1967) 374 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 157.
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normal capacities would in the circumstances have taken; and (b) she could herself,
given her mental and physical capacities, have taken those precautions.14 A capacity the-
orist might therefore have to conclude that the hypothetical defendant in R v B (MA)was
culpable, because that defendant did not act as a reasonable person would have acted,
despite being legally sane, and therefore, capable of having so acted. Furthermore,
capacity theory has been strongly criticised for providing an incomplete account of culp-
ability. It has been pointed out that the capacity to have taken steps to avoid wing, while a
necessary condition for culpability, is certainly not a sufﬁcient condition for it. A person
must have the capacity to do otherwise in order to be culpable, but every instance of
unexercised capacity is not culpable.15 For instance, it is not ordinarily criminally culp-
able to be indifferent to the occurrence of harm to others when one is capable of inter-
vening without any difﬁculty, even if a reasonable person would have so intervened. Yet
a capacity theory of criminal culpability would support a ﬁnding of culpability here as
well.
Character theories of culpability argue that the moral (and therefore criminal)
appraisal of D is properly focused on D’s character rather than purely her choice. The
moral character of D’s actions, and so her moral condition as the agent of those
actions, does not depend primarily upon what she chooses to do. Instead, it depends
upon the motives, concerns and values which inform her actions; on ‘the structures
of attitudes and feeling from which action and choice ﬂow—on, that is, the character
which her actions manifest’.16 So according to character theories, D is personally culp-
able because her actions reveal that she possesses a blameworthy character trait, which is
often spelled out as the trait of ‘being insufﬁciently concerned for the interests of
others’.17 On this account, since the hypothetical defendant in R v B (MA) failed to
act as a reasonable person would have acted, despite being legally sane, he has (arguably)
displayed an insufﬁcient level of concern for the interests of V. This simultaneously evi-
dences, and constitutes, an underlying blameworthy character trait for which he may
rightly be held culpable. However, in making this argument, character theories attract
criticism for deﬁning the ‘in principle’ domain of criminal culpability too broadly.18
Such theories would suggest that in principle, all instances of negligent wrong causation,
including those that are not criminalised, are criminally culpable, since (by the very
virtue of being attributable to negligence) they all evidence a lack of sufﬁcient
concern for the interests of others. This would compel us to argue that most (merely)
negligent wrongdoings are not criminalised for reasons to do with factors other than
culpability—factors like the intrusiveness of regulation in respect of the behaviour con-
cerned, the cost of policing, and the possible social side effects of criminalising
14 Hart (n 7) at 154.
15 RA Duff, ‘Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability’ (1993) 12(4) Law and Philosophy 345, 355. See also
Simester (n 5) at 183–85.
16 Duff (n 15) at 362.
17 See for instance Simester (n 5) at 192–94; Duff (n 15) at 362.
18 Duff (n 15) at 368; Simester (n 5) at 195.
King’s Law Journal 445
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
ive
rp
oo
l] 
at 
09
:02
 09
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
them. This is quite a counter-intuitive suggestion, and appears almost as radically revi-
sionist a view of the criminal law as that generated by choice-based theories of
culpability.
These problems have led to scepticism about whether a uniﬁed theory that com-
prehensively explains the criminal law’s conception of culpability is even possible, and
suggestions that different accounts of culpability may be needed to explain different
types of crimes.19 Perhaps this is true. However, if so, it is not especially helpful. A
theory that says that culpability in the criminal law is ‘disintegrated’, ie, that it may
be founded on the alternative bases of choice and character in respect of different
offences,20 seems to amount to less than the sum of its parts. In jettisoning the
choice theory’s claim to exclusivity, it loses much of the choice theory’s ability to
provide guidance as to the appropriate scope of the criminal law. One can no
longer criticise the criminal law for being over-inclusive on the basis of its application
to inadvertent wing, and in at least some cases, such a criticism would have intuitive
appeal. Although the choice theory’s inability to explain all observed instances of crim-
inal blame was its weakness, in a sense, it was also one of its greatest strengths. More-
over, a disintegrated theory of culpability also retains the character theory’s arguable
inability to limit the in-principle domain of the criminal law to only those instances
of wing that are generally accepted to merit criminal blame. In sum, we should be
reluctant to succumb to the sort of scepticism implicit in this version of a disintegrated
theory of culpability.
III. CRIMINAL CULPABILITY AND THE STAGES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
In fact, I do think that such scepticism may be premature. This is not to suggest that a
single, integrated, conception of culpability operates throughout the criminal law. Far
from it; in this section, I accept that the concept of criminal culpability ought, in a
sense, to be disintegrated. However, I will suggest that it be disintegrated in terms of
the temporal stages of the criminal law, rather than in terms of different categories of
crime.
Let me explain what I mean by ‘the temporal stages of the criminal law’. In the
context of their attempt to situate the role of deterrence in criminal justice, Simester
and von Hirsch highlight the fact that the criminal justice system operates in stages,
and has different functions at each stage.21 The ﬁrst stage of criminal justice is prospec-
tive or forward-looking, and has to do with its purely norm-setting function. At this
stage, the criminal law communicates to the public at large, and ex ante proscribes
19 See for instance Simester (n 5) at 180; Horder (n 11).
20 As suggested by Simester (n 5).
21 AP Simester and Andreas von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs (Hart Publishing 2011) 3. The authors
divide the operation of substantive criminal law into three stages: criminalisation; adjudication and con-
viction; and punishment. In this piece, I focus on the ﬁrst two stages. See also Paul H Robinson, Structure
and Function in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press 1997) 125.
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harmful conduct by criminalising it. In doing so, it creates norms that guide their
addressees as to what they should or may, do or avoid doing,22 on pain of criminal sanc-
tion. The second stage of criminal justice is backward-looking—it is adjudicatory
and evaluates a defendant in light of her past conduct. Once a general norm of the crim-
inal law is violated, the system must evaluate the prima facie offender’s conduct ex post
facto to see whether she deserves a blaming judgment and, if so, whether she also
deserves punishment. At this stage, the criminal law communicates primarily with the
particular defendant. In this paper, I will adopt this description of how the criminal
law functions.
The foregoing review of the extant theories of culpability reveals that none of them
has focused in any sustained manner on whether the criminal justice system relies on the
same conception of culpability across both temporal stages of the criminal law. Undis-
putedly, the concept of culpability has a role to play at both the ex ante and the ex post
stages of the criminal law. However, it should not be assumed that it plays the same role
at each stage.
A. Culpability at the Ex Ante Stage
At the ex ante criminalisation stage, a theory of culpability performs at least two separate
functions. First, it helps identify the instances of wrong-causation that ought to be crim-
inalised.23 A crime is not committed every time someone suffers a wrong at the hands of
another. For instance, although V suffers a wrong when she suffers an undeserved depri-
vation of her property, for reasons to do with culpability, we may decide that only
instances in which V was deprived of her property dishonestly and with intention per-
manently to deprive, should be criminalised as theft.24 Careless or negligent deprivation
of V’s property is not a crime, although it remains true that V suffers a wrong, and is
entitled to the return of her property (or failing that, its value). Similarly, although unde-
served damage to V’s property wrongs V, we may maintain that only intentional,
knowing or reckless damage to V’s property should amount to criminal damage,
whereas negligent damage to V’s property should not be criminal damage.25 In relation
to some other wrongs, we may feel that even some instances of negligently bringing
22 One may of course maintain, with Sher (n 4), and Holly M Smith, ‘Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignor-
ance’ (2011) 5(2) Criminal Law and Philosophy 115, that morality may guide us about both what one
should do and what kind of person one should be. That said, even those that theorise culpability on
the basis of character accept that for the criminal law at least, actual conduct (by act, or an omission
where there was a duty to act) is essential conduit for culpability. Thus for Bayles (n 8) at 13, 17,
actual conduct is evidence of culpable character, whereas for Duff (n 15) at 372, it is constitutive of culp-
able character. As such, it is generally accepted that the criminal law’s advance guidance to members of the
public focuses on conduct, rather than character. See in this connection Duff (n 15) at 371–74, 380.
23 Chan and Simester (n 4) at 382–88.
24 Theft Act 1968, s 1.
25 Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1.
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them about should be criminalised. So although negligently causing V’s death is not
homicide, we may stipulate that causing V’s death due to gross negligence is.26
Culpability theory gives us the vocabulary at the ex ante stage of the criminal law to
identify the mens rea that must accompany the causation of a wrong, to attract criminal
sanction.
The second role of culpability at the ex ante stage of the criminal law is to arrange
different cases involving the same harm in terms of the causal agent’s blameworthiness,
and to label and punish them differently.27 Thus we differentiate between murder and
manslaughter based on factors to do with the defendant’s culpability. Similarly, we
differentiate between inﬂicting grievous bodily harm with intent, and inﬂicting it reck-
lessly, and assign different labels and punishments to them in rules that contain the
criminal justice system’s ex ante guidance.28 Current culpability theories explain this
gradation of offences by reference to different mens rea states, and much has been
written on why it is more culpable to cause a wrong intentionally, than recklessly, or
negligently.
Most current accounts of culpability are well suited to the analysis at this stage—they
attempt to explain which instances of wrong causation should be criminalised by refer-
ence to the (future) agent’s choice or character, etc as evidenced by her causative role in
the wrong. Much of the debate about the culpability and criminality of negligent wrong
causation belongs to this stage of the criminal law, since the arguments primarily focus
on questions of criminalisation. I will not be commenting on the respective merits and
demerits of the theories that compete with each other at the ex ante stage of the
criminal law here. Instead, I will brieﬂy comment on why culpability at the ex post
stage of the criminal law ought to be analysed differently from culpability at the ex
ante stage, and then offer some suggestions on how ex post culpability judgments
ought to be made.
B. Culpability at the Ex Post Stage
At the ex post criminal trial stage, we no longer need to explain why some actions
ought to be criminalised only if they are performed advertently vis-à-vis circum-
stances and consequences, whilst others may be criminalised even when performed
inadvertently but negligently. Similarly, we no longer need to explain why an action
committed with one mental state is a more serious crime than the same action com-
mitted with another mental state. These tasks have been carried out at the crimina-
lisation stage. If the task of the ex ante stage of the criminal law is to issue guidance to
the public about what to do and what not to do, then the inquiry at the ex post stage
26 R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171 (HL); R v Misra [2004] EWCA Crim 2375, [2005] 1 Cr App R 21.
27 Simester (n 5) at 187.
28 Compare s 18 and s 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
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ought to focus on whether the particular defendant heeded the said ex ante
guidance.29
An account of culpability that is sensitive to the stages of the criminal law would
recognise that in the criminal law’s institutionalised normative system, it is criminalisa-
tion theory (and through it, the ex ante conception of culpability) that is directly con-
cerned with the prohibited consequence, w. It establishes the connection to w, linking
it with the criminal law’s normative guidance to behave so as not to cause w. It is a
mistake to identify the basic challenge of culpability at the evaluative stage of the criminal
law as explaining the link between a moral agent, D, and a proper blaming judgment for
causing some prohibited consequence ‘w’, because this ignores the central role played by
the criminal law’s system of conduct guiding rules. Once the prohibiting norm is in
place, at the ex post stage, culpability theory need only provide an account of the link
between D and the prohibiting norm. The challenge of culpability, in the sense of ex
post blameworthiness then, is to explain why D’s failure to be guided by the prohibiting
norm results in a negative evaluation of D.30 I think that at the ex post stage of criminal
justice, culpability theories that try to trace our negative evaluation of w to D start at the
wrong place.
IV. (RE)DEFINING CRIMINAL CULPABILITY AFTER THE ACT
A. Criminally Culpable Responses to Guidance
If we start at the right place—the guidance contained in doctrinal criminal law as it stood
when D caused w—our culpability assessment takes on a very different ﬂavour. It is easy
to trace our negative evaluation of the fact that D acted contrary to the norm back to
D. Since the criminal law’s conduct norms are meant to guide us as to how we
choose our conduct or behaviour, D shows due regard to them when she chooses her
actions in deference to the guidance that they contain. Conversely, when she does not
let the conduct rules guide her behavioural choices, D acts culpably (or blameworthily).
29 Note that the ex ante guidance to which I refer comes from a system of conduct norms that is drawn from,
but not necessarily identical to, the words of criminal law statutes or the dicta set out in cases. The
expression that this underlying system of conduct guiding norms ﬁnds in doctrine may be clear or
opaque, elegant or clumsy. While all of this doctrinal expression provides fodder for lawyers and
judges to dissect, the general public is guided by the underlying norms. Whereas members of the
general public may not (and usually will not) be able to restate the criminal law’s conduct guidance
with technical accuracy, they will usually have a fairly good sense of how at least the most central (and
most frequently publicised and enforced) criminal laws require them to behave. See in this connection
Karl Binding who, in the German language monograph Die Normen und ihre Übertretung, argues that
the guidance in the criminal law is actually contained in a set of norms separate from, and underlying,
doctrinal law. Hampered as I am by the language barrier, I refer instead on this point to the summary
of Binding’s thesis in Albin Eser, ‘Justiﬁcation and Excuse’ (1976) 24 American Journal of Comparative
Law 621, 625.
30 The idea that culpability is connected to norms rather than wrongs is not entirely novel. For a previous
attempt to link criminal culpability to the criminal law’s norms see Hampton (n 11).
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Accordingly, D’s criminal culpability (ie, her deservingness of criminal blame) depends
on her attitude31 towards the criminal law conduct rules, and not on her causing the
consequence sought to be avoided by the applicable conduct rule.32
This is a signiﬁcant revision of the traditional way of understanding ex post culpabil-
ity because the expression of an inappropriate attitude towards a norm is not equivalent
to causing the harm that the norm was designed to prevent. Although choosing to ignore
or behave contrary to the norm usually coincides with causing the outcome that the
norm is calculated to avoid (and vice versa), it need not. D may display a deplorable atti-
tude towards the norm’s guidance without causing the feared outcome, as in the case of a
failed attempt to violate a norm. Similarly, she may cause the feared outcome without
displaying a blameworthy attitude towards the norm, as in the case of harm inadver-
tently caused to another’s rights.
With that in mind, we must determine when it is possible to say that D displayed an
inappropriate attitude towards the criminal law’s guiding norms. A person may fail to
obey the guidance in the criminal law’s norms in several ways, not all of which necess-
arily merit blame. First, she may fail to select her behaviour by reference to the criminal
law’s guidance advertently—choosing not to follow it, despite knowing that it applies.
She may do so because she disagrees with its content, or simply does not wish to take
the trouble to obey it. This is certainly an inappropriate attitude towards the criminal
law’s guiding norms, and even a character theorist would agree that D’s knowing
choice not to be guided by an applicable norm can support a ﬁnding of culpability
(albeit through a revelation about D’s character).33
Secondly, she may fail to select her behaviour by reference to the criminal law’s gui-
dance inadvertently—because at the time that she chooses her conduct, she is unaware
31 My reference to an ‘attitude’ here should be understood in contradistinction to Sendor’s usage of the same
term in his explanation of the desert of criminal liability. See Benjamin B Sendor, ‘Mistakes of Fact: A
Study in the Structure of Criminal Conduct’ (1990) 25 Wake Forest Law Review 707, 726–27. Sendor is
concerned with the defendant’s attitude (in particular, the attitudes of respect or disrespect) towards
the right protected by a norm, whereas I am interested in the defendant’s attitude to the norm itself.
Sendor’s reference to the defendant’s attitude to the right protected by the norm allows him to consider,
in addition tomens rea factors, aspects of the defendant’s mental state generally relevant at the supervening
defence stage. In contradistinction, the defendant’s attitude to the criminal law’s norms (which is the atti-
tude in which I am interested) is not inﬂuenced by aspects of the defendant’s mental state primarily con-
cerned with establishing the existence of a supervening defence.
32 A similar argument was also made by Karl Binding in Die Normen und ihre Übertretung. See in this con-
nection, the summary of Binding’s thesis in Eser (n 29), 625. For Binding, a criminal act breaches a norm
drawn from a set of norms separate from, and underlying, doctrinal law, and a person was guilty of acting
wrongfully when she directed her will towards violating these underlying norms. See also Hampton (n 11).
Duff (n 15), 363–64 too brieﬂy considers the possibility that an improper attitude towards the criminal
law’s norms may be the basis for culpability, although he identiﬁes having and acting upon that attitude
as a character trait. Thus he would explain that an agent’s criminal culpability arises from her possession of
that character trait. Although this move is open to him, it seems somewhat unnatural to identify the
‘having and acting upon of an improper attitude towards the criminal law’s norms’ as a character trait.
It bears little resemblance to other (more recognisable) character traits that Duff also identiﬁes—traits
such as honesty, dishonesty, courage, cowardice, generosity, meanness, compassion and callousness.
33 Simester (n 12) at 603.
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of the norm. This may be because she is unaware of situational facts that make the norm
applicable, or she is unaware of the content of the applicable norm.34 For the purposes of
the present piece, we can set aside the latter possibility. In most cases, ignorance of the
norm is dealt with by a stipulative meta-rule, which usually, but not inevitably, deems a
person to be informed of all the conduct guidance in the criminal law. Theorists like
Ashworth35 and Husak36 have criticised the intransigence of such a meta-rule, and I
have considerable sympathy for their arguments. However, entering into a debate on
the merits of this meta-rule here would entail too great a deviation from the central
theme of this paper, and so for the present purposes, I will assume that such a meta-
rule exists and applies. Therefore, in this paper, I will treat the explanation that one
was ignorant about the applicable norm as being unavailable to the agent.
The importance of the shift in focus from blaming based on the outcome contem-
plated by a norm to blaming based on the agent’s responsiveness to the norm is best show-
cased by what it suggests about whether ex post criminal blameworthiness can stem from
the other form of inadvertence. Since criminal blameworthiness (though not necessarily
moral blameworthiness), depends on the agent’s attitude towards the norm, a person
cannot be criminally culpable without displaying an inappropriate attitude towards the
criminal law’s normative guidance. It seems unlikely that one can display an attitude
towards a norm without adverting37 to it. The suggestion that ‘if D can display an “atti-
tude” of “I cannot be bothered to be careful not to be in violation of a right” when she
negligently causes the prohibited outcome, she can also display the attitude of “I cannot
be bothered to be careful not to be in violation of a norm”’ misses the point. An attitude
towards ‘being in violation of a norm’, is not the same as an attitude towards the norm
itself. To be in violation of a norm is to have caused the harm that the norm was designed
to prevent, and as previously explained, causing or avoiding harm is not coterminous with
accepting or rejecting the corresponding norm’s guidance.38 Of course, one can be careless
34 Note that the reference here is to ignorance of the content of an underlying norm, rather than ignorance of
the proper technical statement of a doctrinal rule. See in this connection the discussion in n 29. Ignorance
of the content of the underlying norm is likely to be less common than ignorance of the legal technicalities
that are almost always generated by an attempt to precisely express the content of the norm in statute or
case law.
35 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Ignorance of the Criminal Law, and the Duties to Avoid It’ (2011) 74 Modern Law
Review 1.
36 Douglas N Husak, ‘Mistake of Law and Culpability’ (2010) 4 Criminal Law and Philosophy 135.
37 For a sophisticated account of what it means to advert to something (in that case, a risk of harm, as
opposed to my proposed alternative focus on the norm guidance), see Moore and Hurd (n 6), 152–56,
who also, citing different arguments, conclude that liability in the criminal law ought to be predicated
only on advertence, and that criminal liability based on inadvertence is normatively illegitimate.
38 The same logic also tells us that the attitude of ‘I cannot be bothered to be careful not to be in violation of a
right’ is not an attitude towards the right itself. This is the difference between causing harm negligently and
doing so advertently. Sendor (n 31), 727 errs in treating carelessness as an attitude towards the underlying
right. Carelessness is actually an attitude towards being in violation of a right, and that is why, vis-à-vis the
underlying right, it is inadvertent. Blameworthiness for inadvertently wing derives from deﬁciencies in
identifying and analysing situational facts, and not (in the absence of additional norms) from a deﬁcient
attitude vis-à-vis norms.
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about ﬁnding out the normative guidance available. However, in view of the meta-rule
mentioned previously, ignorance (careless or otherwise) of the content of the criminal
law’s guidance does not exculpate an agent either.
In order to truly deserve criminal blame then, a person should advert to a criminal
law norm, and display an inappropriate attitude to its guidance. She must, that is, at least
be subjectively reckless about, or wilfully blind to, the possibility of disobeying the nor-
mative guidance offered. In other words, she must at least advertently choose not to
exercise her capacity to avoid violating the norm. Inadvertent criminal law norm viola-
tions are not criminally blameworthy.39
On the view of ex post criminal culpability described, a ﬁnding of criminal culp-
ability only makes sense in relation to the set of norms containing the criminal law’s
ex ante guidance. One may be ex post criminally culpable vis-à-vis the criminal law’s
guiding rules, but one cannot directly be ex post criminally culpable vis-à-vis a
wrong.
B. Where Is the Guidance?
This of course means that we need to identify the parts of the criminal law that contain
its guidance, so that we may use them as the touchstone for determining an agent’s ex
post criminal culpability. Undisputedly, at least some of the criminal law’s guidance is
contained in its offence stipulations. Additionally, it is generally accepted that criminal
law justiﬁcations may also guide the behaviour of the public.40 Furthermore, most the-
orists also agree that criminal law excuses ought not to guide the conduct of the public.41
This is because in general, when an agent acts with justiﬁcation, she is seen as having
acted in a desirable (or at least permissible) manner—the law encourages, or at least
permits, others to act as she did. On the other hand, when she is excused for her
actions, she is seen as having acted in principle impermissibly, even though she is
excused from a criminal conviction on the special facts of the case. The law discourages
39 Moore (n 6) at 58 also tentatively suggests the same conclusion.
40 See for instance Hamish Stewart, ‘The Role of Reasonableness in Self-Defence’ (2003) 16 Canadian Journal
of Law and Jurisprudence 317, 333–36; John Gardner, ‘Justiﬁcations and Reasons’ in AP Simester and ATH
Smith (eds), Harm and Culpability (Clarendon Press 1996) 124.
41 See for instance AP Simester, ‘On Justiﬁcations and Excuses’ in Lucia Zedner and Julian V Roberts (eds),
Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press 2012) 108; Simester (n
5) at 193; John Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’ (1998) 1(2) Buffalo Law Review 575, 597; Meir Dan-Cohen,
‘Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law’ (1984) 97(3) Harvard Law
Review 625, 671; Kent Greenawalt, ‘The Perplexing Borders of Justiﬁcation and Excuse’ (1984) 84(8)
Columbia Law Review 1897, 1899–900; Malcolm Thorburn, ‘Justiﬁcations, Powers, and Authority’
(2008) 117 Yale Law Journal 1070, 1095. Amongst the few voices of dissent is that of RA Duff, ‘Rule-Viola-
tions and Wrongdoings’ in Stephen Shute and AP Simester (eds), Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the
General Part (Oxford University Press 2002) 61–68. However, Duff’s argument treats the criminal law’s
guidance as addressing not only what the criminal law expects of D, but also what the criminal law will
grudgingly tolerate from D. This is, at least, a contentious extension of the concept of ‘conduct guidance’,
and it is not a view that has gained much currency.
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other people from following her example, even as it excuses the agent from a criminal
conviction. If excuses ought not to guide conduct (and the argument supporting that
is certainly persuasive), then rules that make excuses available do not form part of the
benchmark by reference to which we assess the agent’s ex post culpability.
This, however, seems to create a bit of a problem. Many culpability theorists, includ-
ing some of those that argue that excuses cannot guide conduct, treat an agent as being
not culpable if she is either justiﬁed or excused.42 If this is correct, then it casts doubt on
the suggestion that ex post criminal culpability has to do with the quality of D’s response
to guidance. If (Proposition 1) D is not culpable when excused from criminal liability,
and (Proposition 2) rules relating to excuses do not guide D’s conduct, then how can a
theory that ties D’s culpability (or non-culpability) to her response to the criminal law’s
conduct guidance explain her non-culpability when she is excused?
The problem outlined is a false one. Culpability theorists who treat excused agents as
being non-culpable are working with a moral conception of culpability,43 rather than the
uniquely criminal conception offered here. Usually, this works tolerably well because we
expect some correspondence between moral culpability and criminal liability. For
instance, we might legitimately expect persons who are not morally culpable not to
suffer criminal liability. However, we should be careful not to conﬂate criminal liability
and criminal culpability44—a criminally culpable person may nevertheless be excused
from criminal liability, if, for instance, she is not morally culpable. Whereas a defen-
dant’s access to an excusatory criminal law defence may coincide with her being able
to demonstrate moral non-culpability, it need not depend on her ability to demonstrate
criminal non-culpability. It is therefore at least potentially a mistake to criticise a theory
of criminal culpability for its failure to generate the results intuitively expected from a
theory of moral culpability.45
This response does not fully address the concern raised. To do that, one would need
to offer an account of excuses in the criminal law that does not depend on the negation
of criminal culpability. Whilst a demonstration of such a model of excuses would require
a separate paper, it is certainly not implausible to suppose that there can be such a
model.46 Some excuses, like insanity and infancy, are denials of responsible
42 See for instance John Gardner, ‘Crime: In Proportion and in Perspective’ in Offences and Defences (Oxford
University Press 2007) 227; John Gardner, ‘Fletcher on Offences and Defences’ in Offences and Defences
(Oxford University Press 2007) 151; Moore (n 6); Simester (n 5) at 200; Chan and Simester (n 4) at 382.
43 See for instance Gardner, ‘Crime’ (n 42) at 225; Chan and Simester (n 4) at 383–84; Simester (n 5) at 180,
188–89, 192–94, 198; Moore (n 6) at 30–31; Peter Arenella, ‘Character, Choice and Moral Agency: The
Relevance of Character to our Moral Culpability Judgments’ (1990) 7(2) Social Philosophy and Policy
59; Duff (n 15) at 345, 361.
44 Simester (n 5) at 195.
45 One such critique is the critique of some choice theories of culpability offered by Duff (n 15) at 350–61,
380. Duff summarises his objections to the choice theory by saying that ‘anyone who begins with “choice”
as supposedly deﬁnitive of criminal liability is forced to move from “choice” toward “character” by the
need to explain such excuses as duress and insanity … ’.Duff (n 15) at 380. Whereas theories of moral
culpability may need to be capable of accounting for excusatory defences, it does not follow that theories
of criminal culpability must also be capable of doing so.
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agency.47 Exculpation in such ‘irresponsibility’ excuses have nothing to do with culp-
ability—the inquiry never gets that far, because there is no point in investigating the
culpability of someone who is not a responsible moral agent. On the other hand,
excuses like duress do not deny the defendant’s responsible moral agency; quite
the contrary, they afﬁrm it. But even in these excuses, exculpation need not
depend on the negation of criminal culpability. It might, for instance, depend on
the negation of moral culpability despite the subsistence of criminal culpability. In
fact, that proposition might explain why, despite excusing the defendant from crim-
inal liability, the criminal law does not encourage other persons to act in the same
way as the defendant did. Moreover, such an explanation of non-irresponsibility
excuses is not entirely without foundation in the extant literature on excuses—Gard-
ner’s suggestion that the gist of a non-irresponsibility excuse is that the defendant
lived up to the standards of character societally expected of her48 can be seen as
laying the foundations of such an explanation.
If we take ‘culpability’ to refer to ex post culpability vis-à-vis the criminal law’s
guiding rules, then hardly anyone would dispute that a person who successfully
pleads a non-irresponsibility excuse remains culpable. The challenge to this paper’s
account of culpability after the act seemingly posed by theorists who treat excused
actors as not being culpable therefore dissolves. This paper deals with criminal culpabil-
ity, whereas those theorists are concerned with moral culpability.
C. Blameworthiness and Blame
It remains true that a person may choose to accept the criminal law’s normative gui-
dance, and still w and conversely, that she may reject the normative guidance, but still
fail to w, because we as humans simply cannot control all our circumstances.
By the yardstick of culpability suggested, a person may deserve criminal blame
depending on her attitude towards the criminal law’s norms even if the apprehended
outcome does not materialise.49 Intuitively, we do think that two persons who do
their utmost to commit a murder are equally bad persons, even when due to blind
luck, only one of them succeeds, and the conception of culpability proposed here
46 Indeed scepticism has previously been voiced about how closely criminal culpability and excuses can be
tied. See for instance Simester (n 5) at 182–83, 187.
47 Gardner (n 41) at 587–90; John Gardner, ‘In Defence of Defences’ in Offences and Defences (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2007); Simester (n 41) at 96–97.
48 Gardner (n 41).
49 In this context, see Matthew H Kramer, The Ethics of Capital Punishment: A Philosophical Investigation of
Evil and Its Consequences (Oxford University Press 2011) 204–06 for a general discussion of failed attempts
and unmaterialised risks. I do not adopt Kramer’s view without reservation—in particular, I have reser-
vations about his assertion that the degree of harm that actually occurs in some way positively correlates
with the degree of evilness attributable to the conduct. Nevertheless, I agree with the underlying assertion
that moral blame may be deserved even when no harm actually materialises.
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explains why. In fact, Alexander and Ferzan argue that in cases of this sort, equal crim-
inal liability should ensue for both the successful attempter and the failed one.50
The argument made herein about how we should conceptualise culpability in the
criminal law does not commit us to going as far as Alexander and Ferzan. There is a
difference between the defendant’s blameworthiness (which is addressed by the argu-
ment on the nature of ex post culpability) and the blame that the criminal justice
system can actually award a defendant. For a liberal criminal justice system to blame
a defendant, it must have something for which to blame her.51 When no one or
nothing is affected by the defendant’s actions, those actions would prima facie continue
to lie within the private domain of the defendant, and it would, in general, be illiberal for
the criminal law to intervene.52 In other words, the ﬁnished product of criminal blame
(understood in terms of the criminal law’s ex ante guidance) requires both something
for which to blame (w), and blameworthiness on the part of the person that brought
about w. The outcome of the agent’s actions creates the (blamer’s) entitlement to
blame, whereas the agent’s attitude to the norm creates her own desert of blame.53
Both blameworthiness, and something for which to blame, are necessary, but not inde-
pendently sufﬁcient, preconditions for the criminal law to assign blame. Hence, while
both the successful and the unsuccessful attempters may be equally blameworthy in
respect of the norm designed to prevent wing, the criminal law’s entitlement to blame
for wing extends only to the successful attempter.
D. In Summary
The argument made here is sensitive to the distinction between the enterprise of crim-
inalisation and the enterprise of determining blameworthiness. We criminalise the
causing of w by creating a criminal law conduct norm against doing or causing w,
because, for instance, w is harmful. Having done that, it is redundant for us again to
refer to the occurrence (or otherwise) of w when determining an agent’s blameworthiness
in respect of said conduct norm. I argue that the agent’s blameworthiness at the criminal
law’s ‘after the act’ stage should instead depend on her attitude towards the applicable
conduct norms. Furthermore, I suggest that these conduct norms may be found in
the criminal law’s offence stipulations as well as in the justiﬁcations it makes available
in respect of these offences.
50 Larry Alexander and Kimberley Kessler Ferzan, ‘Results Don’t Matter’ in Paul H Robinson, Stephen
Garvey and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan (eds), Criminal Law Conversations (Oxford University Press 2009).
See also Gardner, ‘Crime’ (n 42) at 227.
51 Even if this something is the mere fact of the attempt.
52 See in this connection JS Mill, ‘Of the Limits of the Authority of Society over the Individual’ in Jonathan
Riley (ed),Mill On Liberty (Routledge 1998); Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of Criminal Law Vol 1: Harm
to Others (Oxford University Press 1984); Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of Criminal Law Vol 2: Offense to
Others (Oxford University Press 1988).
53 This is a conclusion with which I think Michael Moore would agree. See Michael S Moore, ‘The Indepen-
dent Moral Signiﬁcance of Wrongdoing’ (1994) 5 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 237.
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Although an agent’s criminal blameworthiness depends on her attitude towards the
criminal law’s conduct norms, I argue that the criminal law ought only to blame blame-
worthy agents if there is something for which to blame them. For that reason, the proposed
account of criminal culpability does not compel us to embrace a result-independent
conception of the criminality of conduct.
V. CRIMINAL CULPABILITY AFTER THE ACT AND LIABILITY FOR
INADVERTENT ΦING
A. The Guidance in Crimes of Negligence
If this is an accurate sketch of criminal culpability after the act, then criminal culpability
cannot arise from carelessness or negligence vis-à-vis the proscribed outcome, and so in
principle, criminal liability should not ﬂow from inadvertently wing. While this con-
forms to our intuitive association of the label ‘criminal’ with being wicked or evil,
rather than being not observant enough, or poor at understanding the signiﬁcance of
what one does observe,54 the criminal law often punishes for wing negligently or with
objective recklessness.55 In doing so it seemingly designates a person criminally blame-
worthy because of her carelessness or negligence vis-à-vis w. Since negligence-based liab-
ility is relatively commonplace in the criminal law, it would seem that carelessness or
54 As Kramer (n 49) at 188 notes:
Numerous wrongs are committed through negligence. Although some negligent wrongs are
extremely harmful… none of them is properly classiﬁable as wicked. Carelessness is a vice,
and it can lead to horriﬁcally injurious consequences in some settings; but the gravity of the culp-
ability of a careless action, even when calamitous results ensue therefrom, is not sufﬁcient to
render the action evil.
55 As Sendor (n 31) at 714, and Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2005) 81,
note in other contexts, negligence is an adequate threshold for legal blame. Since the criminal law is,
amongst other things, a tool for social regulation, the extension, for regulatory reasons, of the criminal
law to making blaming judgments in respect of deﬁciencies in identifying and analysing situational
facts, even in the absence of special normative guidance, is tempting, and indeed some would say pervasive
in modern legal systems. On this point, see also Lord Rodger’s separate concurring judgment in R v G
[2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 AC 1034. For the reasons I have stated, I consider such a use of the criminal
law to be philosophically inappropriate. Lord Bingham too voiced a similar opinion in R v G, noting that:
… it is not clearly blameworthy to do something involving a risk of injury to another if (for
reasons other than self-induced intoxication … ) one genuinely does not perceive the risk.
Such a person may fairly be accused of stupidity or lack of imagination, but neither of those fail-
ings should expose him to conviction of serious crime or the risk of punishment. [32]
Nevertheless, I do accept that there is some scope for legitimate criminal liability when the criminal law
chooses to offer normative guidance as to how much care one should take while identifying and analysing
situational facts.
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negligence can, and regularly does, found criminal liability. It would therefore appear
that the normative proposition I make is implausibly revisionist. In fact it is not.
Most cases in which the criminal law seems to impose liability for carelessness or
negligence may be explained in a manner that is compatible with the arguments I
make. These cases may be seen as instances in which, in addition to the primary
conduct rule (which may direct its addressees not to bring about w), the criminal law
has also adopted an institutionalised benchmark for the quality of care it expects to
be taken by the addressees of the primary conduct rule, in ensuring that they are appro-
priately guided by it. This benchmark is often (though not inevitably) set by reference to
the objective reasonable person, who is sometimes imbued with selected capacity-limit-
ing characteristics that are also possessed by the defendant. There is extensive literature
on exactly which characteristics of the defendant should be so selected, but I do not
propose to comment on that issue at this stage (although I will return to it later in
this paper). Instead, I propose that in adopting an institutionalised benchmark, the
criminal law supplements its primary conduct norm with a secondary one as well.
Since it is within the agent’s control to be more, or less, careful while gathering facts
about a given situation and extrapolating conclusions on the basis of these facts, norma-
tive guidance as to this aspect of the agent’s behaviour is conceptually plausible. More-
over, it is easy to see that when an agent ignores such normative guidance, this would
evidence an inappropriate attitude towards the criminal law’s guiding rules, and
support a ﬁnding of criminal culpability relatable to the secondary norm. Consider
for instance, special regulations that require persons who offer adventure-sports activi-
ties to take special care to ensure the safety of their equipment. When the subject of this
normative guidance does not take the required amount of care, she is culpable vis-à-vis
the said regulations.56
So where the criminal law proscribes an outcome w, and institutionally requires that
each person take as much care as a reasonable person would, to make sure that she does
not cause w, the cumulative normative guidance offered to the addressee is the following:
Primary Norm: Do not cause w; and
Secondary Norm: Take as much care as a reasonable person would, not to inadvertently
cause w.
These norms are only violated when D (advertently) does not choose her behaviour
by reference to them.57 D violates the Primary Norm when she advertently chooses not
to exercise her capacity to avoid wing58 (whether or not she actually ws). She violates the
Secondary Norm when she advertently chooses not to exercise her capacity to comply
56 See also Jeremy Horder, ‘Gross Negligence and Criminal Culpability’ (1997) 47 University of Toronto Law
Journal 495, 508–10, 517–20, for observations that are, at least in part, compatible with the propositions
made here.
57 Or is treated as having done so in terms of a meta-rule of the type described previously.
58 Although, depending on the wording of the Primary Norm, this may also include being subjectively reck-
less as to wing.
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with the Secondary Norm, ie, to take as much care to avoid inadvertently wing as a
reasonable person would. Of course the same failing might also be described as negli-
gence vis-à-vis the outcome, but the criminal liability that is imposed is better under-
stood as being predicated on the display of an inappropriate attitude towards the
Secondary Norm. Here too the defendant’s blameworthiness can be traced to an adver-
tent failure to conform to normative guidance.
This explanation of blaming decisions within the institutionalised system of the
criminal law helps us to make sense of both cases involving advertent wing and most
cases that have hitherto been seen as instances of criminal liability for inadvertent
wing. It does so in a manner that replicates the certainty of the link offered by choice-
based approaches to culpability, between our judgments about what the agent did,
and the agent herself. So for instance, when the law’s standing to blame is generated
by the death of a person, criminal blame for murder ensues if the causal agent displayed
an inappropriate attitude to the criminal law norm against killing another,59 whereas
criminal blame for gross negligence manslaughter ensues if she displayed an inappropri-
ate attitude to the criminal law norm requiring each person to take enough care to not be
grossly negligent in the performance of her duties, when such negligence might result in
the death of a person. Similarly, consider the law relating to rape (and most sexual
offences) in England and Wales. Prior to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the mens rea
requirement in relation to the complainant’s lack of consent was the absence of an
honest belief that the complainant was consenting.60 So a defendant who honestly
believed that the complainant had consented could not commit rape. This formulation
treated negligence vis-à-vis forming the belief that the complainant was actually consent-
ing as irrelevant to the sort of blame apportioned by the criminal law. The normative
guidance offered in relation to consent in the pre-Sexual Offences Act 2003 era was as
follows:
Primary Norm: Do not have sexual intercourse with V without her consent.
If D genuinely believed that V was consenting, then no matter how unreasonable that
belief was, D was not culpable vis-à-vis the Primary Norm, and could not be convicted
of raping V. This outcome was compatible with the proposition that at its core, a crim-
inal conviction signals at least that the convict did not have due regard for the criminal
law’s conduct rules.
The law on this point was changed by the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Under section 1
(1)(c) thereof, themens rea now required in relation to consent for the rape offence is an
absence of reasonable belief in the complainant’s consent. Again, section 1(2) of the Act
explains that ‘[w]hether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the
59 I ignore for the moment doctrinal oddities that mean that in some jurisdictions, a person can be convicted
of murder even without intending to kill the deceased, if she intended to inﬂict serious injury upon the
victim, and death resulted.
60 DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 (HL). See also the Sexual Offences Act 1956, s 1(2)(b).
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circumstances, including any steps [D] has taken to ascertain whether [V] consents’.
With some slight simpliﬁcation for ease of explanation, the normative guidance now
offered in relation to consent ought to be parsed as follows:
Primary Norm: Do not have sexual intercourse with V without her consent.
Secondary Norm: Take as much care as a reasonable person would to ensure that any
evaluation you make that V is consenting is correct.
On this view too, if D genuinely believed that V was consenting, then no matter how
unreasonable that belief was, D would not be culpable vis-à-vis the Primary Norm.
However, if D refused the guidance of the Secondary Norm, and did not take as
much care as a reasonable person would have taken to ensure that his evaluation
about V’s consent was correct, then D would be culpable vis-à-vis the Secondary
Norm. If the proscribed consequence (ie, non-consensual sexual intercourse) occurred,
then D could be criminally convicted, because D would be criminally blameworthy vis-
à-vis the Secondary Norm, and there would also be something for which to blame D. Of
course, it remains open for the culpability theory applicable at the ex ante criminalisa-
tion stage to tell us that a person who ws by violating a Primary Norm (ie, ws intention-
ally or recklessly) is more culpable than someone who ws by violating a Secondary Norm
(ie, ws negligently), and should therefore be punished differently.
It is important to unpack the criminal law’s conduct norms in an offence that appar-
ently blames for negligence vis-à-vis the proscribed outcome in this manner because
doing so helps us avoid the unfortunate rulings like R v B (MA)61 discussed earlier.
That ruling arose out of the erroneous belief that the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 1
(and, more generally, the criminal law as a whole) blames for negligence vis-à-vis the
outcome. It could be avoided by recognising that when the criminal law appears to
blame for negligence vis-à-vis an outcome, it is in fact:
(a) issuing additional normative guidance requiring addressees to take special care in
forming judgments about the existence and signiﬁcance of situational facts that
affect their ability to comply with other criminal law norms, and
(b) blaming addressees for their failure to choose their actions by reference to this
additional guidance.
On this account of criminal culpability after the act, D deserves blame relatable to the
Secondary Norm only if he chooses not to exercise his capacity to achieve the standards
of care in identifying and analysing situational facts that a reasonable person would have
attained.62 Even assuming that incapacity-based defences are unavailable, as they were in
61 See n 1.
62 This is a slight modiﬁcation of the standard account of choice-based culpability proposed by theorists like
Moore (n 6) at 57 and Finkelstein (n 10), and recounted by others like Simester (n 5) at 185. The standard
account proposes that a moral agent, D, is (prima facie) culpable or blameworthy for causing the pro-
scribed outcome, w, only if she chooses not to exercise her capacity to avoid causing w. In terms of the
King’s Law Journal 459
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
ive
rp
oo
l] 
at 
09
:02
 09
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5 
R v B (MA), if D honestly tried, but was unable, to achieve the prescribed standards of
care in identifying and analysing situational facts, D would not be culpable vis-à-vis the
Secondary Norm, because he obeyed the guidance in the Secondary Norm.
Such an outcome has intuitive appeal, and criminal law doctrine does try to accom-
modate it to some extent. It does so by, in ﬁtting cases, moderating the benchmarks set by
the law in order to minimise the injustice that would be caused by judging persons with
capacity-limiting (though not capacity-denying) characteristics by reference to the stan-
dards of the objectively reasonable person. Hence, the objectively reasonable person is
usually attributed the defendant’s age, gender and physical disabilities. But this approach
is inadequate and inelegant. The identiﬁcation of the features of the defendant that ought
to be so attributed has consistently proved to be controversial, and it has been difﬁcult to
defend the selection of any exhaustive list of such features by reference to principle. Hence,
when cases like R v B (MA) arise, courts proceeding on the basis that the criminal law
blames for negligence vis-à-vis an outcome are still forced to make rulings that even
they ﬁnd disturbing63 in order to preserve doctrinal integrity. The alternative approach
argued for herein sidesteps these problems by offering a clear and principled basis for
exonerating any person found to have honestly tried to meet the prescribed standards
of care in identifying and analysing situational facts, even when she fails.
Of course, it is also open for the criminal law to adopt a Tertiary Norm relating to the
reasons for which D may fail to achieve the standards prescribed in another norm, and in
fact, it often does just that. Consider for instance a defendant who fails to comply with a
criminal law norm because she is in a self-induced state of automatism, or is voluntarily
intoxicated. The criminal law often holds such a person criminally blameworthy when the
outcome proscribed by the Primary Norm occurs. So for instance, the subtext of:
(a) rules that inculpate persons who offend in a self-induced state of automatism,64
(b) rules that inculpate voluntarily intoxicated persons65 (or if you prefer, prevent them
from raising evidence of their voluntarily intoxicated state to negate mens rea66),
and
(c) rules that prevent defendants from relying on mistakes attributable to their volun-
tarily intoxicated state,67
argument made in this section, I have replaced the reference to the causing of the proscribed outcome w,
with a reference to the violation of the norm that proscribes wing.
63 See for instance the manner in which the Court of Appeal in R v B (MA) tried to moderate the effect of its
statement of the law in [40]–[41].
64 See for instance R v Quick [1973] QB 910 (CA); R v Bailey (1983) 77 Cr App R 76 (CA); and R v Coley
[2013] EWCA Crim 223, [2013] Crim LR 923.
65 See for instance, DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443 (HL) at 474; R v Kingston [1995] 2 AC 355 (HL) at 369
and AP Simester, ‘Intoxication Is Never a Defence’ (2009) 1 Criminal Law Review 3. Cf R v Heard [2007]
EWCA Crim 125, [2008] QB 43 at 53–54.
66 Simester and others (n 3) at 702–03.
67 See for instance the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 76(5).
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is that there is (tertiary) normative guidance in the criminal law against voluntarily
doing something that jeopardises the effective exercise of one’s capacity to comply
with another criminal law norm, and a person who displays an inappropriate attitude
to this Tertiary Norm is criminally culpable. This guidance tends to be supplemented
by a special rule that restricts D’s liability for wing due to a failure to be appropriately
guided by the Tertiary Norm, to liability for a basic intent offence involving wing.
B. Outlying Cases
It appears to me that a large majority of seemingly negligence-based convictions can
be explained on the basis of this version of culpability theory. Of course, even such a
culpability theory would not inculpate a defendant of the sort contemplated in the
dicta in R v B (MA). The arguments made herein offer a normative case for rejecting
for the small minority of convictions that cannot be explained on the basis of second-
ary or tertiary normative guidance. Since the number of cases so rejected would be
small, the theory of culpability proposed would not seem to be implausibly revisio-
nist. Moreover, the rejection of cases of the type contemplated in R v B (MA)
improves the criminal law’s ability to deliver fair culpability judgments, and is there-
fore to be welcomed.
Embracing an acquittal in R v B (MA) would not require us to deny that V suffered a
wrong. Whether V suffered a wrong, and whether the person who authored that wrong
deserves to be blamed for it, are two separate questions. It is conceptually possible for the
law to exonerate D from criminal blame while still recognising that V suffered an unde-
served wrong, and on that basis, continue to make civil law remedies available to V for
the wrong she suffered.68 Neither is an acquittal worrying from a crime prevention per-
spective. It is possible to empower the court to order compulsory remedial treatment for
a defendant of the sort considered in R v B (MA) while nevertheless exonerating him
from criminal blame.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The crux of the argument presented in this paper is that the culpability analysis appro-
priate for the ‘after the act’ stage of the criminal law is different in scope from the one
appropriate for the criminalisation stage. I suggested that criminal culpability at the
‘after the act’ stage arises from advertent failures to show due regard to the criminal
law’s guiding norms, and that it must be coupled with the actual creation of a proscribed
outcome in order to generate criminal blame.
The main signiﬁcance of this argument in terms of criminal legal theory lies in the
separation of the question ‘Is it appropriate to convict D for wing?’ from the question ‘Is
68 Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962.
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it appropriate to criminalise wing?’ In this paper I suggest that the former at least may be
answered primarily by reference to procedural morality. We need only ask:
(1) Was advance guidance issued telling people (including D) not to w because wing is
a crime? And
(2) Did D choose not to exercise her capacity to be guided by the advance guidance?
If the answer to both these questions is ‘Yes’, then it would be appropriate (at least given
the criminal law guidance that exists) to convict D for wing.
On the other hand, when analysing whether it is appropriate to criminalise wing, we
should consider different factors. These would include the substantive morality of wing,
the effectiveness of criminalisation as a means to reduce wing, and the possible side
effects of criminalising wing.69 I do not examine these factors here, except to point
out that they are not directly relevant to determining culpability after the act. Therein
lies the value of keeping these inquiries separate. In apportioning these factors according
to the inquiry to which they are germane, we avoid confusing issues. It is therefore hoped
that this paper will clarify the terms of the existing theoretical discourse on culpability,
and better focus future debates on the subject.
This paper also has something of value to offer to doctrinal criminal law. The
approach to determining criminal culpability after the act proposed herein generates
blaming outcomes that are fairer and that have greater intuitive palatability than the out-
comes generated by judges working within the framework of existing accounts of crim-
inal culpability. It treats offence stipulations and justiﬁcation defences as sources of
conduct guidance and relates culpability to responses to this guidance, rather than to
outcomes. In this way, it allows criminal courts to base culpability rulings on factors
wholly within the defendant’s control (viz, how she chooses to respond to the guidance)
rather than on matters that may be inﬂuenced by happenstance (viz, consequences).
Additionally, it allows courts to sidestep convoluted, and possibly unanswerable, ques-
tions about which characteristics of a given defendant may fairly be attributed to a
hypothetical reasonable person.
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